Karadzic was the world’s most wanted man before 9/11, and has finally been captured. He originally went on the run in 1996. Why does this matter by the way? It took 12 years to find one man, dependent on his relatives and close friends, in a small region in a small country. The only thing that changed was the political willpower in Serbia. The U.S. public does well to take this lesson to heart. Our military doesn’t have Bin Laden today, and more than likely won’t have him for a while.
1. – The U.S. isn’t going to prop Musharraf up. He is not going to stick his neck out in the interests of a country that isn’t going to keep him in power. He is fighting enough people just to avoid the gallows, he has neither the will nor the capability to tackle the Taleban in his country. It’s been that way for 20 years, and it’s going to stay that way.
1a. – Pakistan is so 2001, our new buddy in the region is India. With the U.S. aiding India’s nuclear development, why should the country that will more than likely be on the receiving end of Indian nukes fall over themselves to help us?
1b. – The Taleban is the real deal. They can wait, they can win, they can hold it. Afghanistan is the asshole of U.S. interests in the region. We made just enough of a commitment so that Karzai can hold a few parades a year in Kabul without being assassinated. Everybody knows it too. We aren’t fully committed, we’re not going to be fully committed, the U.S. public is bored with Afghanistan. Pakistan knows better than to cross it’s capable neighbor/roommate the Taleban, because the Taleban would be more than happy to kick Musharraf out of Pakistan altogether.
Conclusion: It takes more than tough talk and a few thousand troops to track down these super fugitives. It’s the long game that yields these kinds of results. Today, in Afghanistan, the U.S.’s long game doesn’t look so strong. If it seems like no one else there is fully committed, they aren’t. We are just going to have to wait for Bin Laden to screw up royally in order to catch him.